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Abstract
We extend one of the main ndings in Bossmann et al. (2007)("Bequests,
taxation and the distribution of wealth in a general equilibrium model," Journal of
Public Economics, 91, 1247-1271). Bequest motives per se reduce wealth inequality.
We show that the result holds for a stronger criterion of inequality comparison
between distributions. Bossmann et al. (2007) use the coe¢ cient of varation as
the inequality measure. Our Lorenz dominance result implies their result. We
also strengthen two other conclusions in Bossmann et al. (2007). Earnings ability
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inheritance could increase wealth inequality and estate taxes could decrease wealth
inequality.
JEL classication: D31; E21; H23
1 Introduction
We extend one of the main ndings in Bossmann et al. (2007): Bequest motives per
se reduce wealth inequality. We show that the result holds for a stronger criterion of
inequality comparison between distributions. Bossmann et al. (2007) use the coe¢ cient
of variation as the inequality measure. Our Lorenz dominance result implies their result.
Following Bossmann et al. (2007), we investigate the impacts of intergenerational
links on wealth inequality in a simple two-period overlapping generations (OLG) hetero-
geneous agents model. Each agent lives for two periods: young period and old period.
Each young agent supplies 1 unit of labor inelastically and has idiosyncratic labor ef-
ciency risk lt. Old agents do not have labor earnings. Agents have "joy-of-giving"
bequest motives. Government collects an estate tax and redistributes the tax revenue to
all young agents in the economy as a lump-sum transfer.
As in Bossmann et al. (2007), we nd that an economy with bequest motives has a
more equal wealth distribution than an economy without bequest motives. Our result
extends Bossmann et al. (2007) in three respects. First, we only assume that fltg is a
stationary and ergodic while Bossmann et al. (2007) assume that fltg is either i:i:d: or a
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linear mean-reverting process.1 Second, we do not assume that var(lt) <1. Bossmann
et al. (2007) uses the coe¢ cient of variation as their inequality measure. Thus they need
the nite variance of wealth distribution. Our inequality measures are Lorenz curve
and Gini coe¢ cient, which only require the existence of the mean of wealth distribution.
Third, our result is stronger than that of Bossmann et al. (2007). Our Lorenz dominance
result implies the coe¢ cient of variation result in Bossmann et al. (2007).
We then investigate the impacts of ability inheritance on wealth distribution. We
nd that impacts of earnings ability inheritance on wealth distribution is contrary to
those of bequest inheritance. An economy with the inheritance of earnings ability has
higher wealth inequality than an economy without inheritance of ability. De Nardi (2004)
shows that ability inheritance can increase wealth concentration by simulating a general
equilibrium OLG model with bequest motives. Finally, we investigate the e¤ect of estate
taxes on wealth distributions and nd that estate taxes reduce wealth inequality.
Our theoretical results of the impacts of bequest motives, ability inheritance, and
estate taxes on wealth distribution are about the Lorenz ordering. We do not incor-
porate precautionary savings motives into our model and we have the explicit forms of
individual policy functions. This is di¤erent from the large literature of incomplete mar-
kets heterogeneous agents models, such as Aiyagari (1994), Castaneda et al. (2003) and
De Nardi (2004). These papers usually incorporate precautionary savings motives, solve
1We use fxtg to represent a squence in this paper.
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agents policy functions numerically, and simulate the stationary wealth distribution.2
Lorenz dominance is widely used in the literatures of income and wealth inequality.
For example Chatterjee (1994) uses Lorenz dominance to discuss wealth distribution
in a neoclassical growth model.3 And Zilcha (2003) uses Lorenz dominance to study
the income distribution in an economy with two types of intergenerational transfers:
investment of parents in the education of their o¤spring, and capital transfer. Early
literatures include, among others, Atkinson (1970) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973).
For a recent brief review on this topic see Gajdos and Weymark (2012). We also nd
that the convex order is a convenient tool for our linear model. For example the convex
order is closed under convolutions.4 We use this property in our proof for the conclusion
that estate taxes reduce wealth inequality.5
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic structure
of our model. Section 3 discusses the stationary wealth distribution of our model. We
introduce di¤erent inequality measures in section 4. We show the e¤ect of bequest motive
on wealth distribution in section 5. Section 6 quests the impacts of ability inheritance on
2Benhabib, Bisin, and Zhu (2011) also nd explicit forms of indivudual policy functions and study a
stationary wealth distribution. They emphasize the role of idiosyncratic investment rates of return on
producing the observed fat tail of the wealth distribution in the U.S.
3There is a minor di¤erence about "Lorenz dominance" between Chatterjee (1994) and our paper. In
Chatterjee (1994) "X Lorenz-dominates Y " means that X is more unequal than Y , while in our paper
it means that X is more equal than Y .
4Let X1 and X2 be two independent random variables and let Y1 and Y2 be two other independent
random variables. If X1 cx Y1 and X2 cx Y2, then X1 +X2 cx Y1 + Y2. See the denition of cx in
section 4.2. For this property of the convex order see page 120 of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010).
5Zhu (2012) studies the impacts of income risk on wealth distributions by using Lorenz dominance
and the convex order.
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wealth distribution. Section 7 investigates the e¤ect of estate tax on wealth distribution.
Section 8 concludes the paper. Appendix contains most of the proofs.
2 The model
Our model is an overlapping generations heterogeneous agents economy. Each agent lives
for two periods: young period and old period. Each old agent gives birth to one child.
Each family consists of one parent and one child. There is a continuum of measure 1
families in the economy. The population of the economy keeps constant.
2.1 Agents problem
Young agents work and earn labor earnings. Old agents do not have labor income. They
consume their savings and leave bequests to their children. Each young agent supplies
1 unit of labor inelastically. But young agents have idiosyncratic labor e¢ ciency risk lt.
We assume
Assumption 1: fltg is stationary and ergodic.
Assumption 2: lt > 0 has a nite mean. Without loss of generality,
E(lt) = 1:
Note that we do not need the niteness of var(lt).
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Agents have "joy-of-giving" bequest motives. cyt is the consumption in young period
for an agent born at period t, and cot+1 is his consumption in old period. st denotes his
savings. He leaves bequest bt+1 to his child. The wage rate per e¢ ciency unit is wt. gt
is the lump-sum transfer from the government, and  2 [0; 1) is the estate tax rate. The
interest rate is rt+1.
The following gure shows the timing of the model.
Figure 1: The timing of the model
At the beginning of period t, an young agent receives bequests bt, and pays the estate
tax bt to the government. He draws his labor e¢ ciency lt, and receives government
transfer gt. Then the agent makes consumption and savings decisions. Thus the agents
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problem is a deterministic optimization problem
max
cyt ;st;c
o
t+1;bt+1
(cyt )
1    1
1   + 
"
(cot+1)
1    1
1   + 
[(1  ) bt+1]1    1
1  
#
(1)
s:t: cyt + st = wtlt + (1  ) bt + gt
cot+1 + bt+1 = (1 + rt+1)st
where   1 is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion.  2 (0; 1) is the time discount
factor.  represents the bequest motive.
The agents optimal policy functions are
cot+1=
1
1 + 
1
 (1  ) 1 
(1 + rt+1)st
bt+1 =
1
1 +  
1
 (1  )  1
(1 + rt+1)st
cyt =
1
1 + ~
1

t+1
[wtlt + (1  ) bt + gt]
and
st =
1
1 + ~
  1

t+1
[wtlt + (1  ) bt + gt]
where ~t+1 = 
h
1 + 
1
 (1  ) 1 
i
(1 + rt+1)
1 .
The agents policy functions are linear. These linear policies brings us the linear
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relationship of our main equation (8) as in Bossmann et al. (2007).
From optimal policy functions of bt+1 and st, we derive the individuals wealth accu-
mulation equation
st =
1
1 + ~
  1

t+1
[wtlt + (1  )'(1 + rt)st 1 + gt] (2)
where ' = 1
1+
  1 (1 )
 1

.
2.2 Firms problem
There is an aggregate production rm in the economy. The rm has a Cobb-Douglas
production function Yt = AKt L
1 
t , where A is the technology level, Kt is capital, and
Lt is labor. The rm chooses Kt and Lt to maximize its prot
max
Kt;Lt
fAKt L1 t   wtLt   (rt + )Ktg
where  is the depreciation rate of capital.
The rst order conditions of the rms problem are
rt = AK
 1
t L
1 
t   
and
wt = (1  )AKt L t :
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2.3 Government
The government collects the estate tax revenue and gives a lump-sum transfer to young
generation. Each young agent receives the same subsidy gt. The government has a
balanced budget in every period
gt = 
Z
btdi (3)
where
R
di means the aggregation of young agents.
2.4 General equilibrium
The aggregate population of young agents who are the workers in the economy is 1, and
E(lt) = 1. Thus the labor market clearing condition is
Lt =
Z
ltdi = 1 (4)
where
R
di means the aggregation of young population. The capital market clearing
condition is
Kt+1 =
Z
stdi (5)
where
R
di means the aggregation of young agents.
Aggregating the savings of the equation (2) across young agents and using equations
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(4), (5), and government budget constraint (3), we have
Kt+1 =
1
1 + ~
  1

t+1
[wt + '(1 + rt)Kt] :
From labor market clearing condition we have rt = AK 1t  , andwt = (1 )AKt .
Thus the law of motion of the aggregate capital is
Kt+1 =
1
1 + ~
  1

t+1
[(1  + ')AKt + '(1  )Kt] : (6)
We will concentrate on the steady-state aggregate economy in which the aggregate
capital K, the wage rate w, and the interest rate r are constant.
Proposition 1 The economy has a unique aggregate steady state. An economy with a
higher bequest motive  has a higher steady-state aggregate capital K.
The higher the agents bequest motive, the higher the agents saving incentive. Thus
there are more wealth accumulation. In one extreme case there is no bequest motive,
i.e.  = 0. The steady-state aggregate economy with bequest motives of  > 0 has a
higher aggregate wealth level than the economy without bequest motives. This plays an
important role in our analysis of the impacts of bequest motives on wealth distribution
in section 5.
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3 Wealth distribution
We investigate the stationary distribution of individual wealth accumulation process in
the steady-state aggregate economy. Following Bossmann et al. (2007) we use at+1 to
denote the individual wealth (before interest) in period t+ 1. Thus at+1 = st.
From governments budget constraint, we have
gt = g = '(1 + r)K (7)
in the steady-state aggregate economy.
Substituting equation (7) into equation (2) we have the agents wealth accumulation
equation in the steady-state aggregate economy
at+1 = c3lt + c4at + c5 (8)
where c3 = 1
1+~
  1
w, c4 =
(1 )'(1+r)
1+~
  1
and c5 =
'(1+r)
1+~
  1
K.
Equation (8) is the main equation of our paper. Our aim is to investigate the station-
ary distribution of process fatg in the steady-state aggregate economy. We will study
the stationary distribution of fatg, especially the comparisons of di¤erent economies in
sections of sections 5, 6, and 7, by using the linear relationship of equation (8).6
6Our main equation (8) has the same form as equation (20) of Bossmann et al. (2007). But the
expressions of c3, c4, and c5 are di¤erent from those in Bossmann et al. (2007), because we use di¤erent
utility functions from Bossmann et al. (2007). However that di¤erence is irrelavent to the new ndings of
our paper. It is the linar relationship that permits us to establish the results about Lorenze domninance
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We rst establish the ergodicity of the process fatg.
Proposition 2 0  c4 < 1
In the steady-state aggregate economy aggregate capital K is nite as shown in
proposition 1 and the aggregate savings equal K. Suppose that c4  1, then at ! 1
almost surely. And K = 1. Thus in the steady-state aggregate economy we must
have c4 < 1. Proposition 2 plays an important role when we characterize the stationary
distribution of process fatg.
Proposition 3 The unique stationary distribution of fatg is
a1 = c3
+1X
s=1
cs 14 ls +
c5
1  c4 : (9)
And at converges to a1 almost surely.
As in Bossmann et al. (2007) we show that at converges to a1 almost surely. Boss-
mann et al. (2007) establish this result by the two-series theorem. Thus they need the
niteness of var(lt). We use a di¤erent mathematical theorem in Brandt (1986) and we
do not need the niteness of var(lt). But we still obtain the ergodicity of fatg. Thus at
converges to a1 in distribution, denoted by at !st a1. We use this important property
of convergence in distribution when we investigate the impacts of bequest motives, ability
inheritance, and estate taxes on stationary wealth distributions. In these analyses our
relationship between di¤erent economies in our analyses.
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strategy is that we rst establish the intuition in static situations, then we extend the
results to stationary wealth distributions by observing that they still hold when processes
approach limiting distributions.
4 Inequality measures
We introduce Lorenz dominance and the convex order in this section. The concepts of
Lorenz dominance and the convex order are our basic tools to investigate the impacts of
bequest motives, ability inheritance, and estate taxes on wealth distribution.7
4.1 Lorenz dominance
Following Gastwirth (1971), we dene the Lorenz curve for a non-negative random vari-
able X with a positive nite mean.
Denition 4 Let FX(x) be the cumulative distribution function of a non-negative ran-
dom variable X with a positive nite mean. The Lorenz curve of X, LX(p), is dened
as
LX(p) =
1
E(X)
Z p
0
F X (t)dt; p 2 [0; 1];
where F X (t) = inffx 2 [0;+1) : FX(x)  tg.
7Our main reference book is Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010). A good reference of Lorenz dominance
is Arnold (1987). Another book devoted to the parametric statistical distribution of economic sizes is
Kleiber and Kotz (2003).
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A Lorenz curve satises the scale invariance axiom, i.e. random variables X and cX
share the same Lorenz curve for any constant c > 0. Thus X and X
E(X)
share the same
Lorenz curve.
By the Lorenz curve, we dene the Lorenz ordering
Denition 5 For two random variables X and Y , X Lorenz dominates Y if and only
if LX(p)  LY (p), p 2 [0; 1], denoted by X L Y .
Obviously the Lorenz ordering is transitive, i.e. X L Y and Y L Z imply X L Z.
Note that X L Y implies that the distribution X is more equal than the distribution
Y and the Gini coe¢ cient of X is smaller than that of Y .
Another commonly used inequality measure is the coe¢ cient of variation (CV ). For
a random variable X with a nite variance
CV (X) =
p
var(X)
E(X)
:
Lorenz dominance implies a relation between two random variables with nite vari-
ances.
Lemma 6 If both X and Y have nite variances, then X L Y implies CV (Y ) 
CV (X).
Proof: See page 68-69 of Marshall and Olkin (2007). 
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4.2 The convex order
Following Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010), we dene the convex order of two random
variables.
Denition 7 For two random variables X and Y , X is smaller than Y in the convex
order, denoted by X cx Y , if and only if
E[(X)]  E[(Y )]
for all convex functions  : R! R, provided the expectations exist.
Roughly speaking, X cx Y means that Y is more likely to take on "extreme" values
than X. That is, Y is "more variable" than X.8
Note that the functions 1 and 2, dened by 1(x) = x and 2(x) =  x, are both
convex. Thus X cx Y implies E(X) = E(Y ), provided the expectations exist.
From the denition of the convex order, we see that the convex order is transitive,
i.e. X cx Y and Y cx Z imply that X cx Z.
For two non-negative random variables the convex order is closely related to the
Lorenz ordering.9 Theorem 3.A.10 of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010) states that
8See page 109 of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010).
9For two random variables X and Y with equal means, a su¢ cient and necessary condition for
X cx Y is Z x
 1
F (u)du 
Z x
 1
G(u)du for all x;
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Lemma 8 Let X and Y be two non-negative random variables with equal means. Then
X cx Y if and only if LX(p)  LY (p) for all p 2 [0; 1].
5 Bequest motive and wealth inequality
In order to emphasize the impacts of bequest motives on wealth distribution, following
Bossmann et al. (2007), we set estate tax rate  = 0. Thus c5 = 0. The agents wealth
accumulation equation (8) becomes
at+1 = c3lt + c4at:
Following Bossmann et al. (2007), we assume that there are two economies: economy
A and economy B. Agents in economy A do not have bequest motive, i.e.  = 0. Agents
in economy B have bequest motive, i.e.  > 0 (B for bequest). Let aA1 be the station-
ary wealth distribution of economy A, and aB1 be the stationary wealth distribution of
economy B.
In economy A there is no bequest motive and c4 = 0. Thus
at+1 = c3lt
provided the integrals exist, where F () and G() are the cumulative distribution functions of X and
Y , respectively. See Theorem 3.A.1 of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010). This is a practical way to
establish X cx Y . If E(X) = E(Y ), then X cx Y is equivalent to that X second-order stochastically
dominates Y . Thus the following lemma 8 is essentially the result of Atkinson (1970).
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which has the same Lorenz curve as lt. Thus aA1 has the same Lorenz curve as lt.
In economy B there are bequest motives. By proposition 2 we have 0 < c4 < 1.
Plugging c5 = 0 into equation (9) we have
aB1 = c3
+1X
s=1
cs 14 ls
=
c3
1  c4
+1X
s=1
(1  c4)cs 14 ls:
Thus aB1 has the same Lorez curve as Z 
P+1
s=1(1   c4)cs 14 ls. Note that the random
variable Z is a weighted average of random variables, l1, l2, l3,    . Our analysis of the
impacts of bequests on wealth distribution starts from this observation.
Theorem 3.A.36 of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010) shows that
Lemma 9 Let X1, X2,    , Xn and Y be n + 1 random variables. If Xi cx Y , i = 1,
2,    , n, then
nX
i=1
aiXi cx Y;
whenever ai  0, i = 1, 2,    , n, and
Pn
i=1 ai = 1.
Lemma (9) shows that the weighted average would not increase inequality. We extend
this intuition to the comparison of stationary wealth distributions aA1 and a
B
1.
Theorem 10 Under assumptions 1 and 2, aB1 L aA1.
Note that aB1 L aA1 also implies that the Gini coe¢ cient of aB1 is smaller than
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that of aA1. An economy in which agents have bequest motives has a more equal wealth
distribution than an economy in which agents do not have bequest motives. Our result
extends that of Bossmann et al. (2007) in three respects:
First, we only assume that fltg is a stationary and ergodic. Bossmann et al. (2007)
assume that fltg is either i:i:d: or a linear process as in assumption 3 of section 6 in our
paper.
Second, we do not assume that var(lt) < 1. Bossmann et al. (2007) uses the
coe¢ cient of variation as their inequality measure. Thus they need the nite variance
of wealth distribution. Our inequality measures are Lorenz curve and Gini coe¢ cient,
which only require the existence of the mean of wealth distribution.
Third, our result is stronger than that of Bossmann et al. (2007). Bossmann et al.
(2007) derive the coe¢ cient of variation of wealth, the inequality measure, by calculating
mean and variance of the wealth distribution. By lemma 6, theorem 10 implies that
CV (aA1)  CV (aB1), as shown in Bossmann et al. (2007).
6 Ability inheritance and wealth inequality
Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992) use di¤erent data sets in the United States to study
the intergenerational mobility and nd that the elasticity of childs earnings with respect
to parents earnings is about 0:4. We study the impacts of bequest inheritance on wealth
distribution in last section. In this section we study the impacts of ability inheritance on
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wealth distribution. To that end we, following Davies and Kuhn (1991) and Bossmann
et al. (2007), use a mean-reverting process as the labor e¢ ciency process.
Assumption 3:
lt+1 = l + v(lt   l) + "t+1 (10)
where l = 1 and 0 < v < 1. f"tg is i:i:d: with a zero mean, a nite variance, and a lower
bound su¢ cient to keep lt+1 > 0.
In this section we permit  2 [0; 1). Thus there could be government transfer. The
agents wealth accumulation equation has the general form
at+1 = c3lt + c4at + c5
as in equation (8).
Let l1 starts from the unique stationary solution of equation (10).10 Then fltg is
stationary and ergodic.
Proposition 11 l+ "1 cx lt, 8t  1. Thus the distribution of l+ "1 Lorenz-dominates
lt, 8t  1.
Following Esary et al. (1967) and Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010), we introduce
the concept of positive association.
10For the existence and uniqueness of the stationary solution of equations Yn = AnYn 1+Bn, n = 1, 2,
   , with independent pairs f(An; Bn)g, see Vervaat (1979). The conditions in assumption 3 guarantees
that there exists a unique stationary solution of equation (10) by part (b) of Theorem 1.6 of Vervaat
(1979).
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Denition 12 Random variables X1, X2,   , Xn are said to be positively associated if
Cov (h1 (X1, X2,    , Xn) ; h2 (X1, X2,    , Xn) )  0
for all increasing functions h1 and h2 for which the above covariance is dened.
By Proposition 20.I.13 of Marshall and Olkin (2007), the ability inheritance implies
that fltg are positively associated. Also from equation (10) we have
Proposition 13 Let a1 = 1. Then at and lt are positively associated for t  1.
Actually, from the proof of proposition 13, we see that if a1 is independent of l1 and
f"tg, then at and lt are positively associated for t  1.
We assume that there are two economies: economy H and economy I. Agents in
economy H do not have ability inheritance, i.e. v = 0. Agents in economy I have ability
inheritance, i.e. 0 < v < 1 (I for inheritance of ability). Let aH1 be the stationary wealth
distribution of economy H, and aI1 be the stationary wealth distribution of economy I.
Theorem 3.A.39 of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010) states that
Lemma 14 Let X1, X2,   , Xn be positively associated random variables, and let Y1,
Y2,   , Yn be independent random variables such that Xi =st Yi, i = 1, 2,   , n. Then
nX
i=1
Yi cx
nX
i=1
Xi:
20
Lemma 14 is intuitive. For two random variables X and Y with positive correlation
their sum is more unequal than that of two independent random variables with the same
marginal distributions as X and Y respectively, because there is a sorting mechanism
with the positive correlation. We extend this intuition to the comparison of stationary
wealth distributions aH1 and a
I
1.
Theorem 15 Under assumption 3, aH1 L aI1.
Contrary to inheritance of bequests, the inheritance of ability causes higher wealth
inequality. The di¤erence between inheritance of bequests and inheritance of ability on
wealth distribution as shown in theorems 10 and 15 is due to the di¤erent impacts on
the mean of wealth. The bequest motives increase the mean of wealth in stationary
distribution, i.e.
E(aB1) > E(a
A
1)
since 0 < c4 < 1 in economy B. However, the inheritance of ability only introduces
correlation of earnings ability into the economy and does not inuence the mean of
wealth, i.e.
E(aI1) = E(a
H
1):
21
7 Estate tax and wealth inequality
When investigating the impacts of estate taxes on wealth distribution, we concentrate
on the logarithmic utility as in Bossmann et al. (2007).
Assumption 4: Utility functions are logarithmic.
We need an additional assumption.
Assumption 5: fltg is i:i:d:
Let  = 1, the CRRA utility of section 2 reduces to logarithmic utility. The agents
problem is
max
cyt ;st;c
o
t+1;bt+1
ln cyt + (ln c
o
t+1 +  ln[(1  ) bt+1])
s:t: cyt + st = wtlt + (1  ) bt + gt
cot+1 + bt+1 = (1 + rt+1)st:
The households optimal behaviours are
cot+1 =
1
1 + 
(1 + rt+1)st
bt+1 =
1
1 + 1

(1 + rt+1)st
cyt =
1
1 +  (1 + )
[wtlt + (1  )bt + gt]
22
and
st =
1
1 + 1
(1+)
[wtlt + (1  )bt + gt] :
There is no general equilibrium e¤ect of estate tax on the economy. The estate tax
here has only the role of redistribution. The estate tax does not a¤ect aggregate capital
as well as the interest rate and the wage rate.
The individual wealth accumulation equation is
at+1 = c6lt + c7

(1  )at +  K

with
c6 =
1
1 + 1
(1+)
w
and
c7 =
1
1 + 1
(1+)

1 + 1

 (1 + r)
where w = (1  )A   K, r = A   K 1   , and K =  1 +
1+ 1

+
A
 1
1 
.
Again we starts from a static case.
Lemma 16 For a non-negative random variable X with a positive nite mean, if 0 
^   < 1, then (1  )X + E (X) L (1  ^)X + ^E (X). Thus (1  )X + E (X) cx
(1  ^)X + ^E (X).
A at estate tax plus a lump-sum transfer is equivalent to a progressive tax since
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the e¤ective average tax rate is increasing in bequests.11 Lemma (16) implies that the
higher the at tax rate and thus the higher the lump-sum transfer, the lower the bequest
inequality.12
Let a1 be the stationary wealth distribution of an economy with estate tax , and
a^1 be the stationary wealth distribution of an economy with estate tax ^.
Theorem 17 Under assumptions 2, 4, and 5, if   ^, then a1 L a^1.
Theorem 17 extends the intuition of lemma 16 to stationary wealth distributions.
Our theoretical result of theorem 17 supports the simulation results about the impacts
of estate taxes on wealth distributions by Bossmann et al. (2007). Bossmann et al.
(2007) employ i:i:d: labor e¢ ciency with a two-parameter gamma distribution and nd
that estate taxes reduces the Gini coe¢ cient of the wealth distribution by simulations.
As noted by Bossmann et al. (2007), this result depends on the assumption of utility
functions. For example utility functions with  > 1 in section 2.1 of our paper and CES
utility in Appendix B.1 of Bossmann et al. (2007) may not work, since estate tax rate
inuences the mean of wealth in these cases.
Using the coe¢ cient of variation as their inequality measure, Bossmann et al. (2007)
show that estate tax reduces wealth inequality for both i:i:d: labor e¢ ciency and a linear
11For an individual with before-tax bequest x, the e¤ective average tax rate is
x  [(1  )x+ E(X)]
x
= 

1  E(X)
x

:
12See Fellman (1976) for a study on the e¤ect of progressive taxes on income distributions.
24
process as in assumption 3 of our paper. We only show this result for the i:i:d: case.
Future work could study whether the Lorenz dominance result also holds for a linear
process as in assumption 3.
8 Conclusion
We extends three main ndings in Bossmann et al. (2007). An economy with bequest
motives has a more equal wealth distribution than an economy without bequest motives.
However an economy with inheritance of earnings ability has higher wealth inequality
than an economy without ability inheritance. An estate tax plus a lump-sum transfer
reduces wealth inequality. Bossmann et al. (2007) establish these results by calculating
the coe¢ cient of variation. We strengthen these results by using Lorenz dominance.
25
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9 Appendix
9.1 Proof of proposition 1
Proof: Let Kt+1 = Kt = K in equation (6) we have
K =
 
1  + '
1 + ~
  1
   '(1  )
A
! 1
1 
(A.1)
where ~ = 
h
1 + 
1
 (1  ) 1 
i
(1 + r)1  and r = AK 1   .
Plugging equation (A.1) into r = AK 1    we have
r + 

=
1 + ~
  1
   '(1  )
1  + ' : (A.2)
Plugging ~ = 
h
1 + 
1
 (1  ) 1 
i
(1+ r)1  = 
(1 ') (1+ r)
1  into equation (A.2) we
have
1  

(r + ) + '(1 + r)  (1  ')  1 (1 + r)1  1 = 1:
We show proposition 1 in two cases:
Case (i)  > 1
Note that 0 < ' < 1. Dene
h('; r) =
1  

(r + ) + '(1 + r)  (1  ')  1 (1 + r)1  1 :
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The equilibrium r is determined by
h('; r) = 1:
Note that h('; r) is a continuous function of r, with
h('; ) = '(1  )  (1  ')  1 (1  )1  1 < '(1  ) < 1
and
lim
r!1
h('; r) =1
Also h22('; r) =

1  1


1

(1   ')  1 (1 + r)  1 1 > 0 due to  > 1. Thus h('; r) is a
strictly convex function of r. Therefore there must exist a unique equilibrium r >  .13
Note that h('; r) is strictly increasing in '. For '1 < '2 < 1, suppose that
h('1; r1) = 1 and h('2; r2) = 1:
We have
h('2; r1) > h('1; r1) = 1:
Thus r2 < r1 since h('2; ) < 1 and h('2; r) is a continuous function of r. A higher 
13In the equilibrium r could be negative. Since saving is the only way to bring wealth to the next
period, even if r is negative, the agent still saves.
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implies a higher '. Thus a higher  implies a lower r and a higher K.
Case (ii)  = 1
In the equilibrium14
K =
 
1  + 
1 + 1

+ 
A
! 1
1 
=
0@241

 
1


1 + 1


  (1  )
1 + 1

+ 
35A
1A
1
1 
:
Thus a higher  implies a higher K. 
9.2 Proof of proposition 2
Proof: Obviously c4  0. From equation (A.2) we have
1 + r =

1 + ~
  1


+ (1  )(1  )
(1  ) + '
Thus
c4 =
(1  )'(1 + r)
1 + ~
  1

= (1  )
+ 1 
1+~
  1
(1  )
+ 1
'
(1  ) < 1
since ~ = 
h
1 + 
1
 (1  ) 1 
i
(1 + r)1  > 0 and 0 < ' < 1. 
14In this case ~ = (1 + ).
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9.3 Proof of proposition 3
Proof: Let Bt = c5 + c3lt. Thus fBtg is stationary and ergodic since fltg is a stationary
and ergodic by assumption 1. We have  1  log c4 < 0. Also E(Bt) = c5 + c3 < 1,
since E(lt) = 1 by assumption 2. Thus E(logBt)+  E(Bt) < 1. By Theorem 1 of
Brandt (1986) we obtain the results of proposition 3. 
9.4 Proof of theorem 10
Proof: Note that aA1 has the same Lorenz curve as l1. We only need to show that
aB1 L l1.
In economy B, pick a1 = c31 c4 .
15 Thus
a1 cx c3
1  c4 l1
since a1 = E

c3
1 c4 l1

.16
Suppose that
at cx c3
1  c4 l1.
Thus 1 c4
c3
at cx l1.17
15We abuse notations a little bit. We use at instead of aBt without confusions.
16Let X be a random variable with a nte mean. E(X) cx X can be established by applying Jensens
Inequality and the denition of the convex order.
17X cx Y implies bX cx bY for any b 2 R. Note that (bx) is a convex function of x 2 R if (x) is
a convex function of x 2 R.
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And
at+1 = c3lt + c4at
=
c3
1  c4

(1  c4)lt + c41  c4
c3
at

:
Note that (1  c4)lt + c4 1 c4c3 at is a weighted average of lt and 1 c4c3 at. For 8t  1, lt and
l1 have the same distribution. We have lt cx l1, 8t  1. By lemma 9 we have
(1  c4)lt + c41  c4
c3
at cx l1:
Thus
at+1 cx c3
1  c4 l1:
By mathematical induction we have
at cx c3
1  c4 l1; 8t  1:
Since at !st aB1 we have
aB1 cx
c3
1  c4 l1
by part (c) of Theorem 3.A.12 of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010). By lemma 8 we
have aB1 L c31 c4 l1 since E
 
aB1

= E

c3
1 c4 l1

= c3
1 c4 . Thus a
B
1 L l1. 
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9.5 Proof of proposition 11
Proof: From equation (10) we have
lt+1 = l + "t+1 + v
 
lt   l

:
Let l1 starts from the unique stationary solution of equation (10). Then fltg is
stationary and ergodic. We only need to show that l + "1 cx lt+1:
We know that l + "t+1 and v
 
lt   l

are independent,
E
 
l + "t+1

= l = 1
and
E

v
 
lt   l

= vE
 
lt   l

= 0.
By Theorem 3.A.34 of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010) we have
l + "t+1 cx l + "t+1 + v
 
lt   l

i.e.
l + "t+1 cx lt+1:
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Note that l + "1 and l + "t+1, 8t  1 have the same distribution. Thus
l + "1 cx lt+1:
By lemma 8 we have
l + "1 L lt+1
since E
 
l + "1

= E (lt+1) = l. 
9.6 Proof of proposition 13
Proof: We know that
at =
1  ct 14
1  c4 c5 +
c3
v   c4 (1  v)
l
ct 14   vt 1 + v   c4 + c4vt 1   vct 14
(1  v)(1  c4)
+ct 14 a1 + c3
vt 1   ct 14
v   c4 l1
+c3
t 1X
s=1
vt 1 s   ct 1 s4
v   c4 "s+1
and
lt =
 
1  vt 1 l + vt 1l1 + t 1X
s=1
vt 1 s"s+1:
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Note that
vs   cs4
v   c4 =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 if s = 0
1 if s = 1
cs 14 + c
s 2
4 v + c
s 3
4 v
2 +   + c4vs 2 + vs 1 if s  2
Thus v
s cs4
v c4  0 for s  0. For t  1, at is an increasing function of a1, l1, and "2, "3,    ,
"t. Also lt is an increasing function of a1, l1, and "2, "3,    , "t. And a1, l1, and "2, "3,
   , "t are independent. By Proposition 20.I.13 of Marshall and Olkin (2007), we know
that for t  1, at and lt are positively associated. 
9.7 Proof of theorem 15
Proof: In economy H, v = 0. Thus
aHt+1 = c3
 
l + "t

+ c4a
H
t + c5:
Note that l + "t and aHt are independent.
In economy I, 0 < v < 1. From proposition 13 we know that aIt and lt are positively
associated.
Let aI1 = 1 and a
H
1 = 1. Thus
aH2 = c3
 
l + "1

+ c4a
H
1 + c5 cx c3l1 + c4aI1 + c5 = a2
36
since l + "1 cx l1 by proposition 11.18
Now suppose that aHt cx aIt . Find two independent random variables U and V such
that
U =st lt
and
V =st a
I
t
Thus l + "t cx U and aHt cx V . Thus
c3
 
l + "t

+ c4a
H
t cx c3U + c4V
by the property of the convex order in footnote 17 and part (d) of Theorem 3.A.12 of
Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010).
By lemma 14 we have
c3U + c4V cx c3lt + c4aIt
since aIt and lt are positively associated.
By the transitivity of the convex order we have
c3
 
l + "t

+ c4a
H
t cx c3lt + c4aIt :
18X cx Y implies bX + c cx bY + c for any b; c 2 R. Note that (bx + c) is a convex function of
x 2 R if (x) is a convex function of x 2 R.
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Thus
aHt+1 = c3
 
l + "t

+ c4a
H
t + c5 cx c3lt + c4aIt + c5 = aIt+1
by the property of the convex order in footnote 18.
By mathematical induction we have
aHt cx aIt ; 8t  1:
Since aHt !st aH1 and aIt !st aI1, we have
aH1 cx aI1
by part (c) of Theorem 3.A.12 of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010). By lemma 8 we
have
aH1 L aI1
since E
 
aH1

= E
 
aI1

= c5+c3
1 c4 . 
9.8 Proof of lemma 16
Proof: Let
g(x) = (1  )x+ E (X) , x 2 [0;+1)
38
and
h(x) = (1  ^)x+ ^E (X) , x 2 [0;+1)
Note that g() and h() are non-negative increasing functions dened on [0;+1), since
0  ^   < 1. Also g(x) > 0 and h(x) > 0 for x > 0. Note that h(x)
g(x)
is increasing in
x 2 (0;+1), since
h(x)
g(x)
=
(1  ^)x+ ^E (X)
(1  )x+ E (X)
=
1  ^
1  
241     ^
1  ^

(1  )
E(X)
x+ 
1 E(X)
35 :
By Theorem 3.A.26 of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010) we have g(X) L h(X), i.e.
(1  )X + E (X) L (1  ^)X + ^E (X). By lemma 8 we have (1  )X + E (X) cx
(1  ^)X + ^E (X) since E [(1  )X + E (X)] = E(X) = E
h
(1  ^)X + ^E (X)
i
. 
9.9 Proof of theorem 17
Proof: Note that a1 is the stationary distribution of the stochastic process fatg which
is generated by
at+1 = c6lt + c7
h
(1  )at +  K
i
and a given a1. And a
^
1 is the stationary distribution of the stochastic process fa^tg
which is generated by
a^t+1 = c6lt + c7
h
(1  ^)a^t + ^ K
i
39
and a given a^1.
Let a1 =st a
^
1. Thus a

1 cx a^1 by the denition of the convex order.
Now suppose that at cx a^t . By lemma 16 we have
(1  )at +  K cx (1  ^)at + ^ K
since E

at

= K.
By Corollary 3.A.22 of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010) we have (1   ^)at cx
(1  ^)a^t since

1  ^

is independent of at and a
^
t . By Part (d) of Theorem 3.A.12 of
Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010) we have
(1  ^)at + ^ K cx (1  ^)a^t + ^ K
since ^ K is independent of (1   ^)at and (1   ^)a^t . By the transitivity of the convex
order we have
(1  )at +  K cx (1  ^)a^t + ^ K:
By Corollary 3.A.22 of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010) we have c7
h
(1  )at +  K
i
cx
c7
h
(1  ^)a^t + ^ K
i
since c7 is independent of (1  )at +  K and (1  ^)a^t + ^ K. Note
that c6lt and c7
h
(1  )at +  K
i
are independent. And c6lt and c7
h
(1  ^)a^t + ^ K
i
are
independent. Thus by part (d) of Theorem 3.A.12 of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010),
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we have
c6lt + c7
h
(1  )at +  K
i
cx c6lt + c7
h
(1  ^)a^t + ^ K
i
:
Thus we have
at+1 cx a^t+1:
By mathematical induction we have
at cx a^t ; 8t  1:
Since at !st a1 and a^t !st a^1 thus
a1 cx a^1
by part (c) of Theorem 3.A.12 of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2010). By lemma 8 we
have
a1 L a^1
since E
 
a1

= E

a^1

= K. 
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